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Abstract
The choice of invoicing currency for trade is crucial for the international trans-
mission of macroeconomic policy. This paper develops a three-country model
that endogenizes the choice of invoicing currency and that allows for a share
of rmscosts to be denominated in foreign currency, consistent with the em-
pirical evidence on the high degree of pass-through to import prices. Invoicing
decisions are driven by rmsdesire to hedge costs but also by exchange rate
volatility and currency comovements. The model is tested empirically with
a data set that spans ten currencies and 24 reporting countries, conrming
the importance of currency comovements for the decision to invoice in vehicle
currency. The ndings also imply that if the U.S. share of world output con-
tinues to fall, other currencies will increasingly replace the U.S. dollar as an
international vehicle currency.
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1 Introduction
The choice of invoicing currency in international trade is crucial for the international trans-
mission of macroeconomic policy. For example, Betts and Devereux (2000) demonstrate
that the e¤ects of monetary and scal policy on consumption and welfare can be radically
di¤erent, depending on which currency is used for invoicing. But how do rms choose an
invoicing currency for international trade? Clearly, an exogenous assumption about the
invoicing currency is not satisfactory.
This paper endogenizes the choice of invoicing currency in a three-country model of
monopolistic competition in which rms preset prices under exchange rate risk. They can
either invoice in producer currency, in local currency or in a third vehicle currency and
endogenously choose the currency that maximizes their expected prots. A key feature
of the model is that rms may face a share of their production costs denominated in
foreign currency, a feature which is motivated by empirical evidence showing that the
pass-through of nominal exchange rates is considerably higher to import and wholesale
prices than to consumer prices. One can think of oil as an anecdotal example. Since oil
is traditionally priced in U.S. dollars, from the perspective of non-U.S. rms it counts as
an input denominated in foreign currency. The model gives rise to a forthright hedging
intuition in that rms have an incentive to invoice in a particular currency if they face a
large share of their costs in that currency.
But apart from the hedging intuition, the optimal choice of invoicing currency is also
driven by exchange rate properties. In particular, if a certain currency is relatively volatile,
rms tend to invoice in other, more stable currencies in order to circumvent unnecessary
exchange rate risk. Exchange rate correlations also play an important role. If a third
currency is highly correlated with the vehicle currency, rms have an increased incentive
to invoice in vehicle currency because the high correlation adds to the momentum of the
vehicle currency. The model is partial equilibrium but the same invoicing decisions would
emerge in a general equilibrium framework because as monopolistic competitors, rms
take aggregate variables as given when making their invoicing decisions.
The essential building block that rmscosts are partially denominated in foreign cur-
rency o¤ers an explanation for the special role that the U.S. plays whenever it is involved
in international trade. The majority of trade involving the U.S. either as an exporter
or importer is heavily priced in U.S. dollars to a degree that is unparalleled by other
countries and their respective currencies. The model provides an intuitive explanation in
that pricing in U.S. dollars is optimal both for exporters from and importers to the U.S.
because it allows the rms involved to hedge their costs.
In addition, the models predictions are tested empirically with a comprehensive data
set that includes 24 reporting countries and ten invoicing currencies. A theoretical criterion
based on the model is used to distinguish vehicle currency pricing from local currency
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pricing and the econometric specications are closely intertwined with the model. The
ndings conrm the importance of currency correlations for the decision to invoice in
vehicle currency. They also imply that if the U.S. share of world output continues to
fall, other currencies will increasingly replace the U.S. dollar as an international vehicle
currency.
Empirical data on currency invoicing are still hard to nd. Goldberg and Tille (2005)
give an excellent overview of data availability. In addition, the European Central Bank
(2005) has recently collected a number of invoicing observations on the euro which are
analyzed by Kamps (2005). A number of authors explore other country-specic invoicing
data. Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) examine Canadian invoicing. Oi, Otani and Shirota
(2004) examine Japanese invoicing and Goldberg (2005) analyzes the invoicing of Eastern
European EU accession countries. Wilander (2005) uses a multinomial logit model to
explain the choice of invoicing currency by Swedish exporters. Goldberg and Tille (2005)
focus on industry-specic characteristics such as demand elasticities and exportersmarket
shares but their sample is considerably smaller.
The theoretical invoicing literature is surveyed by Oi, Otani and Shirota (2004) who
provide a detailed discussion of models that endogenize the choice of invoicing currency.
Another review of the literature is presented by the European Central Bank (2005). A
recent theoretical contribution has been made by Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004).
Their general equilibrium framework predicts that exporters wish to invoice in the cur-
rency of the country with the more stable monetary policy. This prediction is related
to the intuition about exchange rate volatility that arises in the present paper. But as
monetary policy is equally stable in most industrial countries, this result in isolation might
be more suitable for comparing rmsinvoicing behavior across poor and rich countries.
Furthermore, their two-country model does not allow for the possibility of vehicle cur-
rency pricing and therefore, no statement can be made about the role of exchange rate
correlations.
Friberg (1998) develops a three-country partial equilibrium model in which a monop-
olist faces costs in domestic currency. The exchange rates, however, are assumed to be
uncorrelated. Goldberg and Tille (2005) also present a three-country model with the possi-
bility of vehicle currency pricing. Their hedging mechanism arises through the assumption
of decreasing returns to scale in production and uctuating marginal costs. By allowing
some of rmscosts to be denominated in foreign currency and by explicitly incorporating
currency comovements, the present model develops a richer hedging intuition that can
also account for the prevalence of U.S. dollar invoicing.
Both Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) and Goldberg and Tille (2005) suggest models
where industry-specic features matter. But industry-specic invoicing data are hardly
available and hence, their models are di¢ cult to test. The predictions of the present model,
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however, are independent of industry-specic characteristics and therefore particularly
suitable for testing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model with the
key feature that some costs are denominated in foreign currency, giving rise to the volatility
and hedging intuitions. Section 3 proceeds to test this theory empirically, making use of
a comprehensive data set and analyzing both vehicle currency pricing and local currency
pricing. Section 4 discusses the special role of the U.S. dollar and highlights questions for
future research. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Endogenous Currency Invoicing
The continuum [0; 1] is the range of all tradable goods in the world, each produced by one
individual rm. There are three countries in the model denoted by k, l and m. Country
k produces the tradable goods range and comprises the rm range [0; nk], country l is in
the range [nk; nl] and country m in [nl; nm] with nm = 1.
2.1 Consumers
Each country-j consumer maximizes a standard Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index dened
over all tradable goods as
CTj 
Z 1
0
(cij)
 1
 d i
 
 1
(1)
where cij denotes the consumption of good i for a country-j consumer and T indicates
tradable goods. The parameter  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and it is assumed to
be the same across countries. The price index, dened as the minimum expenditure for
one unit of CTj , can be derived from (1) as
P Tj =
Z 1
0
(pij)
1 
d i
 1
1 
where pij denotes the price of the good cij . The demand function for good cij follows as
cij =
 
pij
P Tj
! 
CTj (2)
2.2 Firms
A key element of the model is the assumption that rms face production costs that are
not solely denominated in domestic currency but partly in foreign currency. The literature
so far has assumed that inputs are only denominated in domestic currency, for instance
Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005).
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As an anecdotal example one can think of oil, which is a crucial input factor for many
industries and which is traditionally priced in U.S. dollars and thus in foreign currency
from the perspective of non-U.S. rms.1 Similarly, a vast range of raw materials and other
standardized commodities such as certain chemical products are usually priced in U.S.
dollars. Goldberg and Tille (2005) adopt the distinction devised by James Rauch (1999)
of reference priced goods and goods traded on an organized exchange versus di¤erentiated
goods. They nd that the former types of goods are priced considerably less in domestic
(non-U.S. dollar) currencies than di¤erentiated goods.2
Furthermore, the assumption that rms face a part of their costs in foreign currency is
motivated by comprehensive empirical evidence showing that the degree of pass-through
to import and wholesale prices is considerably higher than the degree of pass-through to
consumer prices. This phenomenon is documented, for instance, by McCarthy (2000) and
Campa and Goldberg (2005).3
2.2.1 Production
All rms within one country are assumed to be symmetric and the rm-specic subscript i
will therefore be dropped. A country-j rm uses the Cobb-Douglas production technology
Y Tj = N
j;k
j;k N
j;l
j;l N
j;m
j;m for j = k; l;m (3)
where Y Tj is tradable output produced by a country-j rm. Nj;k, Nj;l and Nj;m denote
input factors that originate from countries k, l and m, respectively, with j;k, j;l and j;m
being their weights in the production process. Thus, Nj;j represents domestic input factors.
The technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale so that j;k+j;l+j;m = 1.
It is furthermore assumed that all inputs are denominated in the currency of the
country of origin. Let Rh denote the h-currency price of the input factors from country
h for all h = k; l;m. Dene the nominal exchange rate ej;h as the j-currency price of
h-currency and eh;j as its inverse with ej;j = 1 for all j = k; l;m and h = k; l;m. Given
this notation the cost function that is associated with production function (3) and that is
denominated in j-currency can be written as
costsj = ej;kRkNj;k + ej;lRlNj;l + ej;mRmNj;m (4)
The technical appendix shows that when rms minimize costs, cost function (4) can be
expressed as
costsj = Bj (ej;kRk)
j;k (ej;lRl)
j;l (ej;mRm)
j;m Y Tj (5)
1For details about oil invoicing see European Central Bank (December 2005, Box 4).
2Goldberg and Tille (2005) consider industries in Australia, Japan and the UK.
3Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) as well as Corsetti and Dedola (2005) o¤er theoretical explanations.
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with Bj = 
 j;k
j;k 
 j;l
j;l 
 j;m
j;m . The optimal cost function (5) is linear in output and
marginal costs therefore do not depend on the amount of output produced.
2.2.2 Optimal Prices
Since marginal costs are constant, a country-j rm can maximize prots with respect to
each individual consumer separately without taking into account the amount sold to other
consumers. Using demand function (2) and cost function (5) one can express expected
prots generically for any combination of h; i; j = k; l;m as
E
h
hj;i
i
= E
"
ej;hp
h
j;i  Bj (ej;kRk)j;k (ej;lRl)j;l (ej;mRm)j;m
 ei;hphj;i
P Ti
! 
CTi
#
(6)
where hj;i denotes the nominal prots denominated in j-currency that a country-j rm
earns by selling its good to an individual country-i consumer for the price phj;i. The
superscript h in hj;i and p
h
j;i indicates invoicing in h-currency. Through multiplying the
price phj;i by the exchange rate ej;h the country-j rm converts its revenue into domestic
j-currency. Through multiplying the price phj;i by the exchange rate ei;h the country-i
consumer converts the price phj;i into country-i currency.
Firms preset prices phj;i before the exchange rates are known. When maximizing ex-
pected prots, they take the exchange rate risk into account, but as monopolistic com-
petitors they take the input prices Ri, composite consumption CTi and the price index
P Ti as given for all i = k; l;m. Maximizing expected prots (6) and solving the rst-order
condition yields the optimal price
phj;i =

  1BjR
j;k
k R
j;l
l R
j;m
m
E
h
e
j;k
j;k e
j;l
j;l e
j;m
j;m e
 
i;h
i
E
h
ej;he
 
i;h
i (7)
Firms are assumed to always invoice in domestic currency when selling to domestic
consumers, i.e. they set the price pjj;j
pjj;j =

  1BjR
j;k
k R
j;l
l R
j;m
m E
h
e
j;k
j;k e
j;l
j;l e
j;m
j;m
i
which is a special case of the generic optimal price (7). But foreign consumers are by
assumption not able to arbitrage away international price di¤erences and rms can there-
fore price-discriminate across countries. Depending on which invoicing currency maximizes
their expected prots, rms from country j have the option when selling in country i for
j 6= i of either producer currency pricing (PCP) by setting the price pjj;i, local currency
pricing (LCP) by setting the price pij;i or vehicle currency pricing (VCP) by setting the
price phj;i if h is the country of the vehicle currency.
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For the discussion that follows, let k be the country of the vehicle currency and l and
m the countries with non-vehicle currencies. As Figure 1 illustrates, three qualitatively
di¤erent pricing relations arise. The rst relation is pricing from the vehicle country to
non-vehicle country l. From the perspective of the vehicle country there is no di¤erence
between PCP and VCP, of course, such that country-k rms face the choice between pkk;l
(PCP=VCP) and plk;l (LCP) when selling to country-l consumers. Similarly, as countries l
and m are symmetric, country-k rms face the choice between pkk;m and p
m
k;m when selling
to country-m consumers.
Figure 1: There are three qualitatively di¤erent pricing relationships. k is the vehicle
country, l and m are non-vehicle countries.
The second relation in Figure 1 is pricing from a non-vehicle country to the vehicle
country. Country-l rms can charge country-k consumers the price pll;k (PCP) or the price
pkl;k (LCP=VCP). The third relation is pricing between the two non-vehicle countries. A
country-l rm faces three options of invoicing country-m consumers. It can set the price
pll;m (PCP), p
m
l;m (LCP) or p
k
l;m (VCP).
2.2.3 The Stochastic Properties of the Exchange Rates
As one can see from the optimal price (7), various exchange rates appear multiplicatively in
the expectations operator and thus, it is important to specify their stochastic properties. In
order to circumvent Siegels paradox, it is assumed that ek;l and ek;m are joint lognormally
distributed with
ln
 
ek;l
ek;m
!
 N
 "
k;l
k;m
#
;
"
2k;l l;m
l;m 
2
k;m
#!
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For simplicity let k;l = k;m = 0. Of course, the variances are always positive (
2
k;l > 0
and 2k;m > 0) whereas the covariance can be negative (l;m R 0). As a result of triangular
arbitrage the relationship el;m = ek;m=ek;l holds.
2.3 Endogenous Choice of Invoicing Currency
Firms plug the optimal prices based on (7) into expected prots (6) and then compare
which invoicing currency maximizes their expected prots. As it will be shown, rms
optimal invoicing decisions are generally driven by two factors - the currency denomination
of costs (represented by the s) as well as the comovement and volatility of exchange
rates (represented by the s). These factors will now be discussed in the light of the three
pricing relations depicted in Figure 1.
In general, note that all invoicing criteria that are explained in the following are inde-
pendent of general equilibrium e¤ects. Since monopolistic rms take aggregate variables
including input prices as given, the optimal price (7) and subsequently the invoicing cri-
teria would be the same in general equilibrium. A partial equilibrium set-up is therefore
su¢ cient in this context to model the endogenous choice of invoicing currency.
2.3.1 Invoicing from the Vehicle Country to a Non-Vehicle Country
Vehicle country rms can set either price pkk;l (PCP=VCP) or price p
l
k;l (LCP) when
selling to country-l consumers. If expected prots E
h
kk;l
i
are higher than expected prots
E
h
lk;l
i
, country-k rms will choose PCP=VCP over LCP, and vice versa. If the expected
prots are equal, rms will be indi¤erent. As it is shown in the technical appendix, this
procedure leads to a necessary and su¢ cient condition for PCP=VCP to be chosen over
LCP 
1
2
  k;l

> (1  k;k   k;l)l;m
2k;l
(8)
The invoicing decision of country-k rms depends on the currency denomination of their
costs (k;k and k;l) and on exchange rate properties (l;m and 2k;l).
Initially suppose l;m > 0 and k;l < 1=2. All else being equal the more inputs are
denominated in domestic currency (i.e. the bigger k;k), the more likely inequality (8)
holds and the more likely country-k rms price in domestic currency (PCP=VCP). Intu-
itively, as a basic hedging argument rms prefer to invoice in domestic currency when a
large share of their costs is denominated in domestic currency. Conversely, given l;m > 0
country-k rms invoice in l-currency (LCP) if k;l > 1=2, i.e. when most costs are de-
nominated in the currency of the destination country. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship
between the invoicing decision and the shares k;k and k;l for the numerical example of
l;m = 1=2 and 2k;l = 
2
k;m = 1.
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Figure 2: Invoicing from k to l for the numerical example of l;m = 1=2 and 2k;l = 
2
k;m =
1.
Apart from the currency denomination of costs, exchange rate properties also play a
decisive role in determining the choice of invoicing currency. Again suppose l;m > 0
and k;l < 1=2. A more volatile exchange rate between k and l (i.e. bigger 2k;l) makes
PCP=VCP more likely. Intuitively, bigger exchange rate volatility 2k;l means a less stable
ek;l exchange rate and by invoicing in domestic currency rms decrease their exposure
to exchange rate volatility. More formally, under PCP=VCP prots kk;l are a convex
function of the exchange rate ek;l due to elastic demand ( > 1) such that rms are better
o¤ by invoicing in domestic currency, an explanation that goes back to Giovannini (1988).
Conversely, under LCP prots lk;l are concave in the exchange rate ek;l. Note that apart
from the elasticity requirement  > 1 for consumption index (1), the invoicing criterion (8)
and in fact all other invoicing criteria do not depend on any particular value of  because
 is the same across countries.
The role of the covariance l;m is easier to understand when rewriting condition (8) as
1
2
  k;l

> k;m
l;m
2k;l
If the exchange rates ek;l and ek;m are positively correlated (implying l;m > 0), then
the currencies of countries l and m become rather similar from the country-k perspective.
Given k;l < 1=2, if the share k;m denominated inm-currency is su¢ ciently high, country-
k rms are better o¤ invoicing in l-currency, i.e. pricing in local currency. This is again
a simple hedging intuition because rms will invoice in l-currency, which is similar to
m-currency, if they face a su¢ ciently big share of their costs in m-currency.
Conversely, given k;l < 1=2 when the exchange rates ek;l and ek;m are negatively
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Figure 3: Invoicing from k to l for the numerical example of 2k;l = 
2
k;m = 1 and k;l =
k;m.
correlated (implying l;m < 0), PCP is always superior to LCP. Intuitively, when k-
currency depreciates against l-currency, costs associated with inputs denominated in l-
currency are higher. But as a result of the negative correlation, at the same time k-
currency appreciates against m-currency, leading to lower costs associated with inputs
denominated in m-currency. In total, the two changes tend to o¤set each other and the
above argument about the convexity of expected prots under PCP=VCP applies. Figure
3 illustrates the e¤ect of the covariance l;m and the share k;m on the choice of invoicing
currency for the numerical example of 2k;l = 
2
k;m = 1 and k;l = k;m.
2.3.2 Invoicing from a Non-Vehicle Country to the Vehicle Country
The second invoicing relationship illustrated in Figure 1 is pricing from non-vehicle country
l to vehicle country k. Country-l rms can charge country-k consumers either the price
pkl;k (LCP=VCP) or the price p
l
l;k (PCP). Comparing expected prots (6) conditional on
these two prices leads to the following necessary and su¢ cient condition for the choice of
LCP=VCP over PCP4 
1
2
  l;l

> (1  l;k   l;l)l;m
2k;l
(9)
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the choice of invoicing currency depending on the variables in
(9), again for the numerical example of 2k;l = 
2
k;m = 1.
As with condition (8), a basic hedging argument provides an intuitive interpretation.
Suppose l;m > 0 and l;l < 1=2. The bigger the vehicle currency denominated share l;k
of costs is, the more likely condition (9) holds and the more likely LCP=VCP is chosen. If
4See the technical appendix.
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Figure 4: Invoicing from l to k for the numerical example of l;m = 1=2 and 2k;l = 
2
k;m =
1.
Figure 5: Invoicing from l to k for the numerical example of 2k;l = 
2
k;m = 1 and l;k =
l;m.
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the domestic currency denominated share l;l of costs exceeds 1=2 and is thus bigger than
the other shares combined, then country-l rms choose to invoice in domestic currency
(PCP). In addition, a bigger 2k;l makes LCP=VCP more likely. When the ek;l exchange
rate is volatile relative to ek;m and thus 2k;l tends to be big relative to 
2
k;m, then due to
triangular arbitrage exchange rate volatility between countries l and m also tends to be
big. Domestic l-currency is therefore more volatile than k-currency and country-l rms
nd it more attractive to invoice in k-currency.5 Intuitively, rms try to avoid invoicing in
currencies that are unstable because it unnecessarily exposes them to exchange rate risk.
If l;l < 1=2 but l;m < 0, then LCP=VCP is chosen. Intuitively, negative covariation
between ek;l and ek;m means that el;k and el;m are positively correlated due to triangular
arbitrage, i.e. from the perspective of country-l rms, the currencies of countries k and
m tend to move in the same direction.6 Given that the cost share l;l denominated in
domestic currency constitutes less than half of total costs, country-l rms are therefore
better o¤ pricing in k-currency in order to hedge exchange rate risk (see Figure 5 for a
numerical example).
As will be explained in Section 3, empirical data are available to test condition (9).
Its testable implications can therefore be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose rms from non-vehicle country l invoice customers from vehicle
country k. If the share l;l of costs denominated in the currency of country l is below
1=2, then invoicing in vehicle currency becomes more likely for (a) a bigger share l;k of
costs denominated in vehicle currency and for (b) a smaller ratio l;m=2k;l of the exchange
rate comovement with the currency of country m and the variance of the exchange rate
between countries k and l. If in addition the ratio l;m=2k;l is below 1, then invoicing in
vehicle currency becomes more likely for (c) a smaller share l;l of costs denominated in
the currency of country l.
2.3.3 Invoicing between Non-Vehicle Countries
The range of possible invoicing choices is biggest between non-vehicle countries. A country-
l rm faces the three options of pkl;m (VCP), p
m
l;m (LCP) or p
l
l;m (PCP) when invoicing
country-m consumers. Again, examining expected prots conditional on these three prices
leads to the following pairwise comparisons. A necessary condition for VCP to be chosen
5Given the lognormal distribution in Section 2.2.3, it can be shown that V ar(ek;l) = V ar(el;k) =
exp(2k;l)
 
exp(2k;l)  1

, V ar(ek;m) = V ar(em;k) = exp(2k;m)
 
exp(2k;m)  1

and V ar(el;m) =
V ar(em;l) = exp(
2
k;l   2l;m + 2k;m)
 
exp(2k;l   2l;m + 2k;m)  1

. An increase in 2k;l therefore in-
creases V ar(el;k) and V ar(el;m), making l-currency relatively more unstable.
6el;m = ek;m=ek;l holds due to triangular arbitrage. It follows ek;l = ek;m=el;m and el;k = el;m=ek;m. If
ek;m goes up, then el;k tends to go up as well because of l;m < 0 and thus el;m tends to go up. Conversely,
if ek;m goes down, then el;k tends to go down and thus el;m tends to go down. Hence, el;k and el;m tend
to move in the same direction.
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over PCP is7 
1
2
  l;l

> (1  l;k   l;l)l;m
2k;l
(10)
which is the same as condition (9). For VCP to be chosen over LCP it is necessary that
1
2
  l;m

> (1  l;k   l;m) l;m
2k;m
(11)
Note that condition (11) is similar to condition (10) but with l;m taking the place of l;l.
In addition, the volatility 2k;m of the exchange rate between vehicle country k and the
destination country m matters now.
Finally, a necessary condition for LCP to be chosen over PCP is
1
2
  l;l

2k;l
2k;m
+ l;l
l;m
2k;m
>

1
2
  l;m

+ l;m
l;m
2k;m
(12)
If l;l < 1=2 and l;m < 1=2 and if l;m is su¢ ciently close to zero, then condition (12) is
more likely to hold in favor of LCP in case of a big foreign currency denominated share
l;m of costs, whereas it is more likely to hold in favor of PCP for a big domestic currency
denominated share l;l.
Perhaps the -variables in (12) can best be understood when considering the variance
of the exchange rate between countries l and m. It is given by V ar(el;m) = V ar(em;l) =
exp(2k;l 2l;m+2k;m)

exp(2k;l   2l;m + 2k;m)  1

. In contrast, the variance V ar(ek;l) =
V ar(el;k) of the exchange rate between countries l and k is a function of 2k;l only and
likewise, the variance V ar(ek;m) = V ar(em;k) is a function of 2k;m only.
8 If 2k;l goes up,
this increases V ar(el;m) and V ar(el;k) and thus makes l-currency more volatile relative to
m-currency. Firms therefore try to avoid pricing in l-currency and LCP (i.e. pricing in
m-currency) becomes more likely. If 2k;m goes up, this increases V ar(el;m) and V ar(ek;m)
and thus makesm-currency more volatile relative to l-currency. If l;l in (12) is su¢ ciently
high compared to l;m, then rms will try to avoid m-currency and PCP (i.e. pricing in
l-currency) becomes more likely.
But if l;m goes up, this decreases V ar(el;m) only and the volatility of l-currency
relative to m-currency is not a¤ected. A change in l;m therefore does not matter with
respect to volatility but rather with respect to hedging. If l;m is negative, this implies
that from the country-l perspective the currencies of countries k and m tend to move in
the same direction such that LCP (i.e. pricing in m-currency) is optimal for su¢ ciently
7As opposed to condition (9), condition (10) is no longer su¢ cient for choosing VCP because LCP is
now a distinct third alternative. In the context of condition (9) LCP is the same as VCP.
8V ar(ek;l) = V ar(el;k) = exp(
2
k;l)
 
exp(2k;l)  1

and V ar(ek;m) = V ar(em;k) =
exp(2k;m)
 
exp(2k;m)  1

. Also see footnote 5.
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high l;m.9 If l;m is positive, this implies that the currencies of countries l and m tend
to move in the same direction such that PCP (i.e. pricing in l-currency) is optimal for
su¢ ciently high l;m. An increase in l;m thus makes PCP more likely for su¢ ciently high
l;m (if l;m > l;l in condition (12)). Conversely, if l;m is negative, PCP is optimal for
su¢ ciently high l;l and thus, an increase in l;m makes LCP more likely if l;l > l;m in
(12).
As will be explained in Section 3, empirical data are available to test condition (12).
Its testable implications can therefore be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 Suppose rms from non-vehicle country l invoice customers from non-
vehicle country m. If the share l;l of costs denominated in the currency of country l
is below 1=2 and if the share l;m of costs denominated in the currency of country m is
below 1=2, then invoicing in local currency (i.e. in the currency of country m) becomes
more likely for (a) a bigger ratio 2k;l=
2
k;m of exchange rate variances. If in addition
l;m=
2
k;m < 1, the invoicing in local currency becomes more likely for (b) a bigger share
l;m of costs; if l;m=2k;m < 
2
k;l=
2
k;m, then invoicing in local currency becomes more
likely for (c) a smaller share l;l of costs; if l;l > l;m, then invoicing in local currency
becomes more likely for (d) a bigger ratio l;m=2k;m of the exchange rate comovement and
the variance of the exchange rate between vehicle country k and importing country m.
Furthermore, the pairwise comparisons (10)-(12) can be combined to yield su¢ cient
conditions for each type of invoicing. For example, a particularly simple case arises if
one assumes positive correlation between ek;l and ek;m as well as relatively big variances
(2k;l > l;m > 0 and 
2
k;m > l;m > 0). It is shown in the technical appendix that in
this case l;k > 1=2 is a su¢ cient condition for VCP, l;m > 1=2 is a su¢ cient condition
for LCP and l;l > 1=2 is a su¢ cient condition for PCP. But as exchange rates are often
negatively correlated, invoicing decisions will in practice depend on parameter values.
Figures 6-8 illustrate some cases of invoicing between the non-vehicle countries l and
m by combining conditions (10)-(12) graphically. 2k;l = 
2
k;m = 1 is again picked as a
numerical example. Figures 6 and 7 show that in line with the hedging argument PCP
occurs when the domestic currency denominated share l;l of costs is su¢ ciently high,
whereas LCP occurs with a su¢ ciently high destination currency denominated share l;m.
If both l;l and l;m are su¢ ciently small and thus l;k is su¢ ciently big, then country-l
rms tend to choose VCP.
Moreover, if l;m < 0 as in Figure 7, then VCP is the optimal choice for a wider set
of parameters because a negative covariance l;m implies that el;k and el;m are positively
correlated and that from the perspective of country-l rms, the currencies of countries k
and m tend to move in the same direction. Similarly, Figure 8 illustrates for the numerical
9See footnote 6.
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Figure 6: Invoicing from l to m for the numerical example of l;m = 1=2 and 2k;l = 
2
k;m =
1.
Figure 7: Invoicing from l to m for the numerical example of l;m =  1=2 and 2k;l =
2k;m = 1.
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Figure 8: Invoicing from l to m for the numerical example of 2k;l = 
2
k;m = 1 and
l;k = l;m.
example of l;k = l;m that for su¢ ciently high l;k VCP is more prevalent when el;k and
el;m are positively correlated (i.e. l;m < 0).
2.3.4 Summary of the Invoicing Conditions
The invoicing decisions encapsulated in conditions (8)-(12) are all driven by the desire
of rms to hedge their costs but also by their desire to avoid exchange rate volatility. If
rms face a big fraction of their costs in a particular currency, they can hedge their costs
by invoicing in that currency. If that currency is highly correlated with another currency,
those two currencies tend to be substitutes. But rms also try to avoid exchange rate
volatility. A conict arises if rms face a large fraction of their costs in a certain currency
and would therefore like to invoice in that currency, but that currency happens to be
especially volatile. It then depends on parameter values which motive prevails.
2.4 Aggregation of Invoicing Decisions
Empirical invoicing data are typically available as invoicing currency shares of total exports
for a particular country and year.10 For example, in 2001 the UK invoiced 29 percent of
its total exports in U.S. dollars. In the same year 16 percent of total UK exports were
sent to the U.S. such that the ratio of invoicing currency share and export share is 29=16
in this particular case. Given this format of available data, in order to empirically test
the model of Sections 2.1-2.3 it becomes necessary to establish the theoretical invoicing
currency shares arising under the distinct options of PCP, LCP and VCP.
10 Invoicing data relating to imports are less frequent and will therefore not be considered.
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For any h let invhj denote the invoicing currency share of currency h as a fraction of all
exports from country j (29 percent in the example). Moreover, let expj;i denote exports
from j to i and let expj be total exports from country j. The country-i export share as
a fraction of total country-j exports is thus given by expj;i=expj . In the above example
when j is the UK and i is the U.S., this share is 16 percent. Now the ratio of invoicing
currency share over export share with respect to h-currency can be dened as
invexphj;i 
invhj
expj;i=expj
for j 6= i
(29=16 in the example). Note that given the available data, invexphj;i can be computed
for h = i (as in the example) and usually also for h = j. But when the invoicing currency
is neither the exporters nor the importers currency (i.e. for h 6= j; i), the ratio invexphj;i
is typically unknown.
2.4.1 Invoicing from the Vehicle Country
As all rms within one country are symmetric, the aggregate invoicing share can be ob-
tained without di¢ culty. When selling to foreign consumers, vehicle country-k rms can
invoice in either domestic (i.e. vehicle) or foreign currency. Under VCP=PCP to all for-
eign customers the invoicing share of the vehicle currency is invkk = 1 and the invoicing
share of the foreign currency is invik = 0. When country-k rms invoice in foreign local
currency under LCP, the invik share corresponds to the export share inv
i
k = expk;i=expk
and the invoicing share of the vehicle currency is invkk = 0. The invoicing/export ratios
therefore follow as
invexpkk;i = expk=expk;i > 1 for i = l;m under VCP=PCP
invexpik;i = 0 for i = l;m under VCP=PCP
invexpkk;i = 0 for i = l;m under LCP
invexpik;i = 1 for i = l;m under LCP
The ratio invexpik;i for invoicing in non-vehicle currency i is therefore bounded by 0 under
VCP=PCP and 1 under LCP.
2.4.2 Invoicing from a Non-Vehicle Country
For exports from a non-vehicle country j = l;m, the invoicing currency shares of the
vehicle currency are invkj = 0 under PCP, inv
k
j = expj;k=expj under LCP and inv
k
j = 1
under VCP such that the corresponding invoicing/export ratios invexpkj;k for the vehicle
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currency are given by
invexpkj;k = 0 for j = l;m under PCP
invexpkj;k = 1 for j = l;m under LCP
invexpkj;k = expj=expj;k > 1 for j = l;m under VCP
invexpkj;k > 1 is therefore a necessary and su¢ cient condition for VCP by a non-vehicle
country rm. The invoicing behavior of UK exporters to the U.S. falls into this category.
As invexpkj;k under VCP is bounded by 1 at the lower end but unbounded from above, it
is referred to in Section 3 as the extent of VCP.11
Finally, if country-l rms export to the other non-vehicle country m, then the invoic-
ing/export ratio invexpml;m for the non-vehicle currency m is bounded by 0 under PCP
and VCP, and invexpml;m is bounded by 1 under LCP such that it can be referred to as
the fraction of LCP
invexpml;m = 0 under PCP and VCP
invexpml;m = 1 under LCP
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 The Invoicing Data
Data on currency invoicing are scarce. Only recently have some government agencies
and central banks started to collect them systematically. For example, the European
Central Bank (2005) has compiled data on the use of the euro as an international invoicing
currency. Goldberg and Tille (2005) give an excellent overview of the data currently
available.
Making use of as big a cross section of data as possible, I consider altogether 56
observations of invoicing relationships for exports. To avoid double counting each invoicing
relationship is included for the most recent observation year only. The 56 observations are
reported by altogether 24 countries. They are the UK, seven eurozone countries (Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain), the ten new EU members
(Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia) plus Bulgaria as well as Australia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.
Invoicing data gathered by U.S. authorities are not publicly available (cf. Goldberg and
Tille 2005, Appendix Table 1).
In total, the observations involve ten currencies. Apart from the U.S. dollar and the
euro the data report invoicing in the Canadian dollar, pound sterling, the Deutschmark,
11As a rather contrived scenario, VCP could also occur with invexpkj;k < 1 if rms from a non-vehicle
country did VCP with respect to other non-vehicle countries but PCP with respect to the vehicle country.
In the theory developed in Sections 2.1-2.3, however, this scenario cannot arise since conditions (9) and
(10) are the same. It will therefore be ignored since it would reect non-optimal pricing.
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the Swiss franc, the Swedish krona, Japanese yen, the New Zealand dollar and the Sin-
gapore dollar. The years of observation vary between 1996 and 2004. The data appendix
gives the precise data sources.
3.2 Output Shares and Export Shares
The weights  in the production function (3) represent the shares of the currency de-
nomination of rmscosts. In order to test the model, a breakdown of rmscosts into
currencies would be ideal as -regressors but such data are not available, certainly not as
macroeconomic data. Instead, I will suggest two alternative measures that are consistent
with the model presented in Section 2.
Assume that the continuum [0; 1] encompasses all input factors in the world. Similar
to the continuum of nal goods, the range [0; nk] of inputs is associated with country k,
the range [nk; nl] with country l and the range [nl; nm] with country m. To allow for the
possibility of nontradable inputs such as internationally immobile labor, assume that for
each country h = k; l;m the share sh of inputs is tradable such that [nh 1; nh 1+ sh(nh 
nh 1)] represents the range of all tradable inputs from country h with nk 1 = 0, nl 1 = nk
and nm 1 = nl.
The rst measure of the s can be motivated by assuming a perfect world without
trade frictions in which all inputs are tradable such that sh = 1 for h = k; l;m. In this
case the s simply follow as relative country sizes and for the empirical analysis, j;h will
be taken as the country-h share of world output for j; h = k; l;m.
In contrast, the second measure of the s arises in a world with trade frictions where
some inputs are nontradable and thus only available to domestic rms such that from
the perspective of country j, sj = 1 but 0  sh  1 for h 6= j. The input range
[nh 1; nh 1 + sh(nh   nh 1)] will now be proxied by total exports of country h 6= j and
the range [nj 1; nj ] will be interpreted as output of country j. The whole range of inputs
available to country-j rms is therefore given by total exports in the world plus country-j
output. For the empirical analysis j;h then follows as the ratio of total country-h exports
over total exports in the world plus country-j output and j;j follows as the ratio of
country-j output over total exports in the world plus country-j output.
To summarize, if there are no trade frictions, the j;hs are determined by output
shares and are the same for all j = k; l;m. In the presence of nontradable inputs the j;hs
are represented by export shares and generally di¤er across j = k; l;m. The empirical
j;hs are computed using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) as
well as data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Details can be found in
the data appendix.
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3.3 Explaining the Extent of Vehicle Currency Pricing
From Section 2.4.2 it follows that an invoicing/export ratio bigger than one (invexpkj;k > 1)
is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for VCP by rms from non-vehicle currency country
j 6= k. 36 out of the 56 observations fulll this condition. Since invexpkj;k under VCP has
a lower bound of 1 but is unbounded from above, it is referred to as the extent of VCP.
As might be expected, virtually all of the 36 VCP observations have the U.S. dollar
or the euro as invoicing currencies, meaning that vehicle currency use can be associated
almost exclusively with these two currencies. The extent of VCP is considerably higher
for the U.S. dollar, the average invoicing/export ratio being 6:5. The biggest value is in
fact 19:9 for Cyprus. In contrast, the average invoicing/export ratio for pricing in euros
is only 1:4 with no single value exceeding 2. Two observations associate VCP with the
Deutschmark for the year 1996, i.e. before the introduction of the euro. The only surprise
is one observation that associates VCP with the Swedish krona for exports from Bulgaria.
Firms from non-vehicle country l can use the vehicle currency as invoicing currency
both when selling to customers from vehicle country k and when selling to customers from
the other non-vehicle country m. The models corresponding theoretical predictions stem
from condition (9) for selling to vehicle country k and from conditions (10) and (11) for
selling to non-vehicle country m. But as explained in Section 2.4, invexpkl;m is typically
unknown so that the distinction between selling to the vehicle country as opposed to selling
to a non-vehicle country cannot be made. For the empirical analysis I will therefore focus
on conditions (9) and (10), which are the same, because this VCP condition applies to
both selling to vehicle country customers (as a necessary and su¢ cient condition) and
selling to non-vehicle country customers (as a necessary condition).
Proposition 1 summarizes the models predictions about the extent of VCP (invexpkl;k).
As the model assumes symmetry amongst all rms within one country, for given values
of relevant regressors it yields the extreme prediction of either no or total VCP in the
aggregate. In practice, of course, rms are heterogeneous and for given regressor values,
one would expect a more diverse aggregate outcome. The share l;l in condition (9) is
below 1=2 for all output share and export share observations in the sample. As implied
by Proposition 1, one would expect a positive coe¢ cient for l;k and a negative coe¢ cient
for l;m=2k;l in a regression of the invoicing/export ratio invexp
k
l;k.
12 For the share l;l
one would expect a negative coe¢ cient because the requirement l;m=2k;l < 1 is met for
the mean of l;m=2k;l (= 0:68) and for 31 out of the 36 single observations.
Note that while l;m is a clear-cut variable in the three-country model, its interpreta-
tion is more di¢ cult for the empirical analysis. In a multi-country world, m represents
the rest of the world with a range of currencies. In order to reect the use of various cur-
12As explained in the data appendix, the s are computed on the basis of demeaned logarithmic exchange
rate series, which is consistent with the lognormal distribution.
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Table 1: Invoicing in Vehicle Currency
Output shares Export shares Export shares
Regressors OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Vehicle country share (l;k) 27:32
(3:82)
34:84
(5:08)
 45:24
( 1:28)
 51:57
( 1:52)
52:26
(3:10)
15:30
(0:60)
Exporters share (l;l)  45:93
( 3:03)
 46:88
( 3:02)
 13:93
( 1:98)
 14:96
( 2:28)
 12:26
( 2:55)
 14:58
( 3:23)
Curr. comovement (l;m=2k;l)  0:66
( 2:43)
 0:61
( 2:69)
 0:62
( 1:66)
 0:36
( 0:82)
 0:42
( 1:78)
 0:35
( 1:65)
Constant  1:99
( 1:10)
 4:68
( 2:65)
10:96
(2:35)
11:88
(2:77)
1:71
(1:26)
5:68
(2:37)
Euro as vehicle currency  8:05
( 4:68)
 5:51
( 2:48)
R2 0.347 0.161 0.363
Dependent variable: the extent of VCP (invexpkl;k) with l 6= k
Sample size: 36 (all observations for which invexpkl;k > 1)
The Heckman procedure uses FIML.
t-statistics given in parentheses, based on robust standard errors.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
rencies, m is interpreted as an entity that uses the IMFs Special Drawing Right (SDR)
as a currency. The SDR is a basket of the worlds major currencies currently containing
the U.S. dollar (45 percent), the euro (29 percent), Japanese yen (15 percent) and pound
sterling (11 percent). Although not perfect, the SDR still serves as a suitable benchmark
for an assessment of the exchange rate properties of the currencies of countries k and l.
More generally, if the model is extended to multiple countries, the qualitative e¤ects of the
s do not change. Intuitively, an additional currency will merely reinforce the importance
of exchange rates whose properties with respect to the vehicle currency are similar to its
own, but it will not create qualitatively new insights.
Table 1 reports regression results for the extent of VCP. l;k is referred to as the vehicle
country share and l;l is referred to as the exporters share.13 The rst pair of columns uses
-regressors based on output shares and the remaining columns use -regressors based on
export shares, as explained in Section 3.2.
When output shares are used, all regressors have the expected signs and are signicant.
In addition to an OLS regression, a Heckman sample selection procedure is estimated as
a robustness check controlling for the fact that only observations are considered for which
the invoicing/export ratio invexpkl;k is greater than 1. Apart from the regressors of the
regression equation, the selection equation also includes a dummy variable that indicates
whether the U.S. is a destination country since the U.S. dollar is a likely vehicle currency
13l;m as the share representing the rest of the world cannot be included because it would be collinear
with l;k and l;l due to the assumption of constant returns to scale.
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candidate. The Heckman estimation procedure yields similar results.
When export shares are used in otherwise the same regressions, the currency comove-
ment coe¢ cient has the correct sign but is no longer signicant. Moreover, the coe¢ cient
of the vehicle country share l;k has the wrong sign but is insignicant. The reason for
the wrong sign appears to be the fact that given its size, the eurozone is a relatively open
economic entity that exports disproportionately many goods.
Indeed, if a dummy variable indicating whether the eurozone is a destination country is
included (see the last pair of columns), the coe¢ cient of the vehicle country share has the
correct sign and is signicant in the OLS regression.14 The currency comovement variable
is signicant, too, and the R2 of the OLS regression is raised to roughly the same level as
in the output share regression, conrming the importance of the underlying heterogeneity.
The nding that the dummy itself has a negative and signicant coe¢ cient might be
related to the fact that the euro as a young currency is not entirely established yet and
that invoicing in euros is expected to rise. Time-series evidence reported by the European
Central Bank (2005) in fact shows that the use of the euro as an invoicing currency has
continually risen since 2000.
Further robustness checks, albeit unreported here, corroborate the results of Table
1. Almost half of the 36 observations involve the ten new Eastern EU member states
as exporters and thus the sample might not be representative. But including a dummy
variable as a xed e¤ect for those countries hardly alters the results. Furthermore, the
sample includes Estonia and Bulgaria which peg their currencies against the euro. Adding
a suitable dummy or removing those observations from the sample does not have any
substantial e¤ect on the results.
In conclusion, Table 1 conrms the predictions for the extent of VCP that emanate
from the model developed in Section 2. In particular, currency comovements appear to be
an important determinant for the decision to invoice in vehicle currency. Note that in the
output share regressions, the absolute magnitude of coe¢ cients is higher for the exporters
share l;l than for the vehicle country share l;k (i.e. the importers share). This result
indicates that the economic strength of the exporting country has a stronger impact on
the extent of VCP than the economic strength of the destination country. It is consistent
with Grassmans (1973) well-known nding that among developed countries exports of
manufactured goods are more often invoiced in domestic currency than imports.
14The l;k coe¢ cient is not signicant in the Heckman regression reported in the last column because
the selection equation includes two dummy variables that indicate whether the U.S. or the eurozone are
destination countries, respectively. These dummy variables e¤ectively pick up the vehicle country share
l;k. Indeed, if the two dummy variables are dropped from the selection equation, the l;k coe¢ cient is
estimated at 49:82 with a t-statistic of 3:05 (signicant at the 1 percent level).
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3.4 Explaining the Fraction of Local Currency Pricing
The aggregation in Section 2.4.2 shows that the invoicing/export ratio invexpml;m for in-
voicing from non-vehicle country l to non-vehicle country m is bounded by 0 in the case of
PCP and 1 in the case of LCP. The ratio invexpml;m is therefore referred to as the fraction
of LCP and Proposition 2 provides the relevant theoretical predictions. 20 out of the 56
observed invoicing/export ratios lie in between 0 and 1.15
No single l;m or l;l observation in the sample is larger than 1=2. According to
Proposition 2 one would therefore expect a positive coe¢ cient for 2k;l=
2
k;m in a regression
of the invoicing/export ratio invexpml;m. As the requirement l;m=
2
k;m < 1 is met for the
mean of l;m=2k;m (= 0:61) and for 13 out of the 20 single observations, one would expect
a positive coe¢ cient for the importers share l;m. For the exporters share l;l one would
expect a negative coe¢ cient because the requirement l;m=2k;m < 
2
k;l=
2
k;m is met for the
mean and for 14 out of the 20 individual observations.16 For the coe¢ cient of l;m=2k;m
the expected sign depends on the relative sizes of l;l and l;m. As for the majority of
observations l;l is smaller than l;m, one might expect a negative coe¢ cient. The U.S.
dollar is now regarded as the vehicle currency k because it is used considerably more than
any other vehicle currency identied in Section 3.3.
Table 2 reports regression results for the fraction of LCP. The rst pair of columns
uses -regressors based on output shares and the second pair of columns uses -regressors
based on export shares. The Heckman sample selection procedure controls for the fact that
observations are only included in the regressions if the invoicing/export ratio invexpml;m is
smaller than 1. Apart from the regressors of the regression equation, the selection equation
includes a dummy indicating whether the U.S. is a destination country. This dummy takes
into account that exporting to the U.S. typically results in the use of the U.S. dollar as
invoicing currency and thus in an invoicing/export ratio that is greater than 1.
All -coe¢ cients have the expected signs and are signicant. Again note that in the
output share regressions, the coe¢ cient of the exporters share l;l is bigger in absolute
magnitude than the coe¢ cient of the importers share l;m, consistent with Grassmans
(1973) nding.
In contrast, the -regressors are not signicant. The relative variance 2k;l=
2
k;m has
the expected sign but the currency comovement l;m=2k;m does not. The latter nding
might arise because the requirement l;l < l;m for l;m=2k;m to have a negative coe¢ cient
is not very clearly met. In addition, as pointed out by the European Central Bank (2005),
15None of those 20 observations are associated with exporters that are vehicle countries as identied in
Section 3.3 such that the invoicing/export ratio invexpik;i for i = l;m from Section 2.4.1 does not apply.
Invoicing data for exports from eurozone countries are not available for non-vehicle currencies. Invoicing
data for exports from the U.S. are not available at all.
16l;k cannot be included as a regressor because it would be collinear with l;m and l;l due to the
assumption of constant returns to scale.
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Table 2: Invoicing in Local Currency
Output shares Export shares
Regressors OLS Heckman OLS Heckman
Importers share (l;m) 1:33
(2:14)
1:22
(2:64)
3:30
(3:00)
2:53
(3:39)
Exporters share (l;l)  6:22
( 2:43)
 4:48
( 2:21)
 1:35
( 2:59)
 0:97
( 2:21)
Rel. variance (2k;l=
2
k;m) 0:01
(1:11)
0:01
(1:33)
0:01
(1:33)
0:01
(1:49)
Curr. comovement (l;m=2k;m) 0:11
(1:35)
0:08
(1:11)
0:08
(1:13)
0:06
(0:90)
Constant 0:23
(3:47)
0:19
(3:49)
0:16
(2:29)
0:16
(2:49)
R2 0.453 0.572
Dependent variable: the fraction of LCP (invexpml;m) with l 6= m
Sample size: 20 (all observations for which 0 < invexpml;m < 1)
The Heckman procedure uses FIML.
t-statistics given in parentheses, based on robust standard errors.
***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
the invoicing data might be noisy inasmuch as some observations refer to the currency of
settlement rather than the currency of invoicing. These results hold up if the regressions
are based on two alternative sets of -regressors. The rst set is computed on the basis
of detrended exchange rate series in order to lter out secular exchange rate trends. The
second set is computed on the basis of exchange rates series that cover a longer time
window.17 Furthermore, the ndings of Table 2 do not change qualitatively if dummy
variables are added for Eastern EU members as well as for Estonia and Bulgaria, which peg
their currencies against the euro. The ndings do not change either if these observations
are dropped.
In summary, the results of Table 2 do not point to a prominent role of exchange rate
variances and comovements in determining the choice of invoicing currency in the case
of local currency pricing. But given the low number of observations and given that the
estimated -coe¢ cients are small, a denite conclusion can hardly be drawn.
4 Discussion
4.1 The Special Role of the U.S. Dollar
The trade ows of many countries are heavily invoiced in U.S. dollars although some of
them do not trade much with the U.S. at all. Poland is a typical case in point. In 2002
17See the data appendix for an exact description.
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roughly 30 percent of total exports from Poland and an equal percentage of total imports
to Poland were invoiced in U.S. dollars but only about 3 percent of Polish trade during that
year was conducted with the U.S.18 Except for the U.S. one cannot nd such an asymmetry
between invoicing and trade ows for any other country including the eurozone. What
can explain this asymmetry?
One explanation for this phenomenon is that invoicing in a vehicle currency can be
e¢ cient by minimizing transaction costs. The three-country model by Rey (2001) is a
recent contribution to this literature.
An alternative explanation is that a large proportion of primary and intermediate goods
are traditionally priced in U.S. dollars, in particular raw materials such as oil products,
metals and other fairly homogeneous commodities. The model developed in Section 2
emphasizes the currency denomination of inputs and the hedging of exchange rate risk as
major driving forces behind invoicing decisions. If rms are dependent on inputs that are
denominated in U.S. dollars, they have an incentive to price in U.S. dollars even if their
products are no raw materials and no homogeneous goods.
In fact, the emphasis on the currency denomination of inputs can potentially also
explain why invoicing involving the U.S. is qualitatively di¤erent from invoicing that does
not involve the U.S. As documented, for instance, by Mann (1986) and Knetter (1989
and 1993), U.S. exporters follow PCP signicantly more than non-U.S. exporters, and
importers to the U.S. follow LCP signicantly more than importers to other countries.
This asymmetry implies a disproportionately heavy use of the U.S. dollar as an invoicing
currency for trade that involves the U.S. American rms tend to price in U.S. dollars
because their costs are mainly denominated in U.S. dollars. Non-U.S. rms typically face
a smaller share of their costs in U.S. dollars but when trading with the U.S., they are
nevertheless inclined to price in U.S. dollars because it provides them with an automatic
hedge. If they priced in their domestic currencies, they would not have this automatic
hedge.
4.2 Questions for Future Research
Data on invoicing are still rare to nd. The empirical literature so far has naturally fo-
cused on invoicing in vehicle currency because of better data availability. But we still
hardly know for which type of trading partner countries invoice in vehicle currency. Japan
is currently one of the very few countries to provide at least a rough breakdown of vehi-
cle currency use into destination countries and regions. Apart from invoicing in vehicle
currency, it is also important to collect more observations on invoicing in non-vehicle
currencies.
18Similarly, Friberg (1998) points out that 50 percent of world trade is invoiced in U.S. dollars while the
U.S. share of world trade in manufactured goods is only 14 percent.
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In addition, there is a need for industry-specic data on invoicing behavior. Goldberg
and Tille (2005) demonstrate the theoretical role of di¤erent demand elasticities across
industries for herding in invoicing decisions. In the context of the currency denomination
of inputs it would matter whether an industry is labor-intensive and therefore faces a
bigger share of costs in domestic currency. The European Central Bank (2005) provides a
rst breakdown of invoicing currency use into goods and services. Presuming that services
are more intensively produced with domestic inputs such as labor, one would expect that
service industries are more prone to price in producer currency.
In order to predict invoicing patterns, it would be instructive to examine time series
data. According to the model of Section 2, if the U.S. share of world output keeps on
falling, then the use of the U.S. dollar as an invoicing currency will diminish.19 But time
series data on invoicing are scarce. Korea is exceptional in that it reports invoicing data
for the U.S. dollar, the yen, Deutschmark and pound sterling from 1976 until 2001. Some
few time series data have also been collected by the European Central Bank.
Finally, it has not been studied empirically what the e¤ects of nancial hedging prod-
ucts are on invoicing decisions. Friberg (1998) develops a model in which exporters have
access to a forward currency market and predicts that the expansion of forward markets
should lead to more invoicing in the importers currency.
5 Conclusion
The choice of invoicing currency is fundamental for the international transmission of
macroeconomic policy and it is therefore essential to understand the factors that drive
the choice of invoicing currency. This paper develops a three-country model of monopo-
listic competition in which rms preset prices under exchange rate risk. They can invoice
either in producer currency, in local currency or in a third vehicle currency and endoge-
nously choose the invoicing currency that maximizes their expected prots. The model is
partial equilibrium but the same invoicing decisions would arise in a general equilibrium
framework since the monopolistic rms take aggregate variables as given.
The key feature of the model is that rms face some of their production costs in foreign
currency, an assumption which is consistent with the empirical evidence of the high pass-
through of nominal exchange rates to import and wholesale prices. A forthright hedging
intuition arises in that whenever a rm faces a high proportion of its costs denominated
in a particular currency, it has an incentive to invoice in that currency.
In addition to the hedging intuition, invoicing decisions are also driven by exchange
rate characteristics. If a certain currency is volatile relative to others, it is less suitable
as an invoicing currency. Exchange rate correlations also play an eminent role. If a third
19The fact that the U.S. has continuously become a more open economy since the end of World War II
does not alter this prediction because the rest of the world has expanded trade even more quickly.
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currency moves in lockstep with the vehicle currency, rms are less inclined to invoice in
their domestic currency because the high correlation accentuates the importance of the
vehicle currency. The model can account for the disproportionate empirical prevalence
of U.S. dollar invoicing for all trade involving the U.S. The disproportionate use can be
attributed to the fact that the dollar is heavily used for pricing intermediate goods like oil
so that it becomes optimal for rms to hedge their costs by invoicing in U.S. dollars.
Furthermore, the model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that en-
compasses 24 reporting countries and ten invoicing currencies. Vehicle currency pricing
is distinguished from local currency pricing using a criterion based on the model. The
results conrm the importance of currency comovements for the decision to invoice in
vehicle currency. The ndings also imply that if the U.S. share of world output continues
to fall, other currencies will increasingly replace the U.S. dollar as an international vehicle
currency.
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Technical Appendix
In order to derive cost function (5), solve the production function (3) for the individual
input factor Nj;m and plug the solution into cost function (4). Then take the derivative
with respect to Nj;k, set the derivative to zero and solve for Nj;k to obtain a rst-order
condition for Nj;k. Repeat this last procedure for Nj;l to obtain a rst-order condition for
Nj;l. Combine the rst-order conditions to obtain the optimal input demand functions
Nj;k =

ej;kRk
j;k
j;k 1ej;lRl
j;l
j;l ej;mRm
j;m
j;m
Y Tj (13)
Nj;l =

ej;kRk
j;k
j;k ej;lRl
j;l
j;l 1ej;mRm
j;m
j;m
Y Tj (14)
A rst-order condition for Nj;m can be derived by rst solving the production function (3)
for the individual input factor Nj;k and then following the above steps analogously. The
resulting optimal input demand function is
Nj;m =

ej;kRk
j;k
j;k ej;lRl
j;l
j;l ej;mRm
j;m
j;m 1
Y Tj (15)
Finally, plug (13)-(15) into (4) and make use of the assumption of constant returns to
scale (j;k + j;l + j;m = 1) to yield cost function (5).
In order to derive invoicing condition (8), set h = j = k and i = l in the generic
expected prots (6) and in the generic optimal price (7) to obtain E
h
kk;l
i
and the PCP
and VCP price pkk;l (PCP=VCP), respectively. Set j = k and h = i = l to obtain prots
E
h
lk;l
i
and the LCP price plk;l. Then set up the necessary and su¢ cient condition that
for PCP=VCP to be chosen over LCP it must be
E
h
kk;l
i
> E
h
lk;l
i
(16)
Based on (6) inequality (16) is given by
E
"
pkk;l  BkR
k;k
k R
k;l
l R
k;m
m e
k;l
k;l e
k;m
k;m

el;kp
k
k;l
PTl
 
CTl
#
> E
"
ek;lp
l
k;l  BkR
k;k
k R
k;l
l R
k;m
m e
k;l
k;l e
k;m
k;m

plk;l
PTl
 
CTl
# (17)
Since a monopolistic rm takes the price level P Tl and consumption C
T
l as given, they
can be dropped on both sides of inequality (17). The factor prices R are also taken as
given. Plugging the prices pkk;l and p
l
k;l into (17), noting that el;k = e
 1
k;l by denition and
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rearranging yields
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which simplies to
E
h
e
k;l+
k;l e
k;m
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i1  
E
h
ek;l
i
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E
h
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(E [ek;l])
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To solve inequality (18) the moment-generating function of the joint lognormal distribution
for ek;l and ek;m is required. Under the assumption of k;l = k;m = 0 as in Section 2.2.3,
it is given by
E

erk;le
s
k;m

= exp

1
2
[r22k;l + 2rsl;m + s
22k;m]

for r; s 2 R (19)
A good introduction to lognormal distributions is provided by Kleiber and Kotz (2003,
Chapter 4). Apply the moment-generating function (19) to inequality (18) and take nat-
ural logarithms to obtain
(1  ) 12
h
(k;l + )
2 2k;l + 2 (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2
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2
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i
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2
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Now rearrange and also use k;m = 1  k;k   k;l to yield invoicing condition (8). Note
that the parameter  drops out of the inequality.
In order to derive invoicing condition (9), generate the LCP and VCP price pkl;k
(LCP=VCP) and the PCP price pll;k from the generic optimal price (7) and plug them
into the necessary and su¢ cient condition for LCP=VCP to be chosen over PCP that
E
h
kl;k
i
> E
h
ll;k
i
Follow the steps of the previous paragraph analogously, noting that el;k = e
 1
k;l by denition
and el;m = ek;m=ek;l due to triangular arbitrage, to arrive at the inequality
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e
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Use the moment-generating function (19) and l;k + l;l + l;m = 1 to yield invoicing
condition (9).
For the derivation of invoicing condition (10) set up the condition that for VCP to be
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chosen over PCP it must be
E
h
kl;m
i
> E
h
ll;m
i
(20)
Generate the VCP price pkl;m and the PCP price p
l
l;m from (7) as well as E
h
kl;m
i
and
E
h
ll;m
i
from (6). Plug the prices and expected prots into inequality (20) and use
el;k = e
 1
k;l , em;k = e
 1
k;m, el;m = ek;m=ek;l and em;l = ek;l=ek;m to solve for
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Use the moment-generating function (19) and l;k + l;l + l;m = 1 to yield invoicing
condition (10).
For the derivation of invoicing condition (11) set up the condition that for VCP to be
chosen over LCP it must be
E
h
kl;m
i
> E

ml;m

and generate the LCP price pml;m from (7). Follow the procedure outlined in the preceding
paragraphs to arrive at the inequality
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which can be solved to obtain invoicing condition (11).
Invoicing condition (12) follows from the initial inequality for LCP to be chosen over
PCP
E

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
> E
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i
which can be equivalently expressed as
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As stated in Section 2.3.3, for the case of 2k;l > l;m > 0 and 
2
k;m > l;m > 0
particularly simple su¢ cient invoicing conditions can be derived for pricing between non-
vehicle countries. In this case l;k > 1=2 is a su¢ cient condition for VCP. In order to
derive this result, use l;k + l;l + l;m = 1 to rewrite invoicing conditions (10) and (11)
as 
l;k   1
2

> l;m
l;m   2k;l
2k;l
l;k   1
2

> l;l
l;m   2k;m
2k;m
Similarly, l;m > 1=2 is a su¢ cient condition for LCP. In order to derive this result, switch
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the inequality sign of (11) to obtain
l;m   1
2

>  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and rewrite (12) as
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
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Finally, l;l > 1=2 is a su¢ cient condition for PCP, which can be seen by switching the
inequality sign of (10)
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and switching inequality (12) and rewriting it as
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
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Data Appendix
All invoicing data refer to the invoicing of exports unless indicated otherwise. The years of
observation vary between 1996 and 2004. Whenever data are available for multiple years,
the most recent observations are chosen. Goldberg and Tille (2005, Appendix Table 1)
give an overview of data availability.
The UK invoicing data are taken from the currency of invoicing press release by HM
Revenue & Customs that can be downloaded from http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/. The data
are for the year 2001, released in July 2002. The UK-Japan and UK-Canada observations
have been computed with the data given in Table 4c. The UK-U.S. and the UK-eurozone
data are taken from Table 4a. The invoicing data for the seven eurozone countries for
exports in U.S. dollars are for the year 2002 and taken from Goldberg and Tille (2005,
Appendix Table 2). The data for the ten new EU members for invoicing in U.S. dollars
and euros are taken from Goldberg (2005, Table 1). Most of them are reported for the
year 2002. For Latvia the data are a combination of invoicing of exports and imports.
For Malta only the invoicing share of imports is available. The Bulgarian invoicing data
are downloaded from the Bulgarian National Bank website at http://www.bnb.bg/, us-
ing the annual export invoicing data. The Australian invoicing data are downloaded from
the Australian Bureau of Statistics website at http://www.abs.gov.au/ and are reported
in the feature article Export and Import Invoice Currencies.The data are taken from
Table 1 for the March quarter of 2004. The Japanese invoicing data are downloaded
from the Japanese Ministry of Finance website at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/.
They can be found in the report by the Study Group for the Promotion of the In-
ternationalization of the Yen, released in June 2001. The Korean invoicing data are
taken from Table 2 (1) in Fukuda and Ono (2004). Their paper can be downloaded at
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/. The Korea-Germany observation is for 1998, the
other observations are for 2001. The Malaysia and Thailand data are taken from an un-
published monograph by Chirathep Senivongs (1997), Currency Internationalization in
Selected ASEAN Countries, International Monetary Fund. The data are reproduced in
Ngiam Kee Jin (2002, Table 1), Financial and Monetary Cooperation in East Asia: The
Singapore Perspective,Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. The data are for 1996.
The export data are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) through
http://www.esds.ac.uk/. All export data are reported in U.S. dollars. The eurozone
is treated as one country such that total exports from the eurozone include exports to
non-eurozone destinations only and no intra-eurozone exports.
The GDP data for individual countries except for Bulgaria are taken from the IMF
International Financial Statistics (IFS) through http://www.esds.ac.uk/ for the same
years as the corresponding invoicing observations. Lines 99B.CZF and 99B..ZF are used
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for nominal GDP, lines 99BIRZF and 99BIPZF are used for the GDP deator with the
base year 2000. The RF.ZF period average exchange rate is used to convert real GDP into
U.S. dollars. The Bulgarian and world real GDP data are taken from the United Nations
Statistics Division available at http://unstats.un.org/.
The raw exchange rate data are taken from the IMF IFS through http://www.esds.
ac.uk/, using the monthly end of period market exchange rate series (line ..AE.ZF). For
each invoicing observation the exchange rate variances and covariances are computed by
considering exchange rate data for the ve years prior to the observation year and for the
observation year itself, i.e. for six years in total. For a number of variances and covariances
involving the euro the calculations have to be based on time series of less than six years
because the euro was only launched in 1999. The exchange rate variances and covariances
are computed in line with the assumption of the joint lognormal distribution in Section
2.2.3 in that the natural logarithm of the exchange rate series is taken and their means
are subtracted, consistent with the assumption k;l = k;m = 0. The -variances and
covariances are then computed with the demeaned logarithmic series.
As a robustness check of the results reported in Table 2, two alternative sets of -
regressors are used. The rst set is based on variances and covariances that are computed
with the demeaned logarithmic values of detrended exchange rate series. As a simple
linear detrending method, the linear trend between the rst and the last observations is
deducted from the individual observations of each exchange rate series so that the rst
and last values of the resulting series are equal. The second set is based on variances and
covariances that are computed by considering exchange rate data for the ten years prior
to the observation year and for the observation year itself, i.e. for eleven years in total.
Exchange rate data for the European Currency Unit (ECU) are used as euro observa-
tions prior to 1999, provided by the Federal Reserve Economic Data database (FRED) at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/. These data report monthly averages of daily
gures as opposed to end of period observations.
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